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Abstract 
In mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), due to unreliable wireless media, nodes mobility and lack of infrastructure, 
providing a key establishment scheme is a big challenge in this unique network environment. In this paper, a hybrid 
group key establishment scheme is proposed for secure communications in MANETs. The nodes in network are 
divided into two parties: Cell group consisting of group members and control group consisting of cell group 
controller. A centralized key establishment scheme is employed in cell group and a decentralized scheme is employed 
in control group. In this scheme, an implicitly certified public key approach is used, which reduces the certificate 
overhead and improves computational efficiency. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of [CEIS 2011] 
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1. Introduction 
MANETs are special type of wireless networks which offer convenient infrastructure-free group 
communication. MANETs are regarded as ideal technology for creating a temporary communication 
network for civilian and military applications. This emerging technology aims to provide “anytime-
anywhere” networking services. While MANETs can be quickly and inexpensively setup as needed, 
security is a critical issue compared to wired or other wireless counterparts. Many passive and active 
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security attacks could be launched from the outside by malicious nodes or from the inside by 
compromised nodes. 
Secure group communication over MANETs requires scalable and efficient group membership 
management with appropriate security mechanisms to protect data and to cope with potential 
compromises. To this end, a group key for data encryption must be distributed securely and efficiently to 
current members. Once a membership change occurs, the group key must be changed to ensure backward 
security and forward security [1, 2].  
The securities of most cryptosystems rely on some underlying secure, robust, and efficient key 
establishment system. Key establishment deals with key generation, storage, distribution, updating, 
revocation, and certificate service. So far, there have been many proposals on group key establishment in 
the recent literatures [3-8]. They range from key distribution schemes for single-sender multicast to key 
agreement schemes for any-to-any peer groups. Although most of them focus on wired networks, 
extension to wireless networks should be explored as such networks are becoming more commonplace.  
This paper proposes a hybrid group key establishment scheme for MANETs. In this scheme, we exploit 
existing well-known group key establishment protocols. The whole ad hoc network is divided into non-
overlapping cell groups (cell layer), and each cell group is composed of a group controller and many 
regular group members. All group controllers constitute the control group (control layer) which acts as 
mobile backbone nodes. The group controller manages its cell group by generating, updating and 
distributing the group key shared among all the cell members. 
In our scheme, each cell group autonomously manages its cell group key for local communications so 
that each cell group key is independent of the other cell group keys. A centralized key establishment 
scheme is carried out within a cell group by the group controller, but a distributed key agreement scheme 
is used within the control group. We confirm that a centralized scheme is appropriate for cell group key 
establishment since most group members are equipped with limited communication and computation 
devices. However, the control group employs decentralized key establishment since group controllers 
have more computation and communication power. Furthermore, decentralization helps us avoid a single 
point of failure. It also provides a more scalable and efficient key establishment service in MANETs. In 
addition, we use the implicitly certified public key method to reduce the overhead of MANETs. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. At first, we discuss the security challenges and 
summarize related work in the field about MANETs in Section 2. The two-layered ad hoc network model 
and corresponding hybrid key establishment architecture present in Section 3. Section 4 provides an 
analysis and discusses the features of the proposed architecture. Finally, we give conclusions in Section 5. 
2. Challenges and Related Work 
Key establishment is an important primitive in providing secure communication for MANETs. 
However, the highly dynamic nature of MANETs (i.e., frequent changes in both topology and 
membership) make key establishment particularly challenging. Therefore, that many traditional key 
establishment approaches are not well-suited to this environment. For example, in popular network 
authentication architectures, two entities authenticate by a trusted certificates authority (CA). While this 
model works well in wired networks, it fails in ad hoc wireless environments.  
A secure and efficient group key establishment scheme in MANETs must focus on the following 
issues: (1) it must be performed securely with relevant keying material delivered via secure channels; (2) 
it can be resistant to a wide range of attacks by both outsiders and rogue members; (3) group key 
establishment scheme must provide forward security with respect to former members and backward 
security with respect to newly admitted members; (4) group key establishment must be scalable, i.e., an 
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important property is to provide group keys independence in different cell groups, changes to the group 
membership should only affect a small cell group but not affect other cell groups.  
There are many researches on group key establishment scheme in the last decade. Previous group key 
establishment schemes can be roughly partitioned into two main classes: (1) centralized group key 
establishment protocols, in which a single entity is employed for controlling the whole group. Many group 
key establishment protocols, such as LKH [5], OFT [4], and Key Graph [6], seek to minimize storage 
requirements, computational power, and bandwidth utilization of group re-keying. LKH and OFT 
schemes can reduce the cost of re-keying from  to , where n is the group size; (2) 
distributed group key establishment scheme, in which there is no explicit key establishment centre, and 
the members themselves do the key generation. All members can perform access control and the 
generation of the key can be either contributory, meaning that all members contribute some information to 
generate the group key, or done by one of the members. So far, several distributed group key 
establishment schemes are proposed, such as GDH [7], DLKH [8]. How to design a secure, efficient and 
practical group key establishment scheme for wireless MANETs is till an open problem. 
( )O n (log )O n
3. Proposed Key Establishment Scheme 
In this section, we describe the two-layered MANETs model and corresponding group key 
establishment scheme in detail. 
3.1. Layered MANETs and Key Establishment Scheme 
All nodes in homogeneous MANETs have the same transmission capabilities while using the same 
frequency and channel access scheme. The bandwidth available to each node rapidly decreases as the 
network size grows. Literatures [9, 10] suggest the use of more heterogeneous, hierarchical MANETs in 
practical applications. A layered ad hoc network model is proposed in [11], we proposed a hybrid group 
key establishment scheme based on the same network model and some assumptions.  
Fig. 1. Layered MANETs 
As mentioned in Section 1, our ad hoc network model as shown in Figure 1, there is two levels: (1) cell 
group composed of group members and a group controller (GC), (2) and control group composed of 
controllers in all cell groups. Nodes at each level have different communication and computation abilities, 
described as follows: members in cell group are equipped with communication and computation limited 
devices. They communicate through bandwidth-constrained short-range broadcast wireless channels. 
Nodes in control group have more communication and computational power. We also make the following 
assumptions: Each node has a unique ID and some one-hop neighborhood discovery mechanisms. 
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Communication between one-hop neighboring nodes is considered more reliable compared with multi-
hop communication.  
The main feature of our structure is a layered approach to group key establishment. Each group 
controller acts as a cell group manager and controls key establishment for group members within its cell 
group. As mentioned earlier, group controllers have sufficiently power and can establish point-to-point 
direct wireless links among themselves. Nodes within the same cell group share a cell group key, which is 
generated and distributed by the group controller and used for traffic encryption. Group controllers share a 
control group key. Each group controller is responsible for relaying data from within its cell group to 
other cell groups, if necessary. For this purpose, the relayed data is re-encrypted with control group key 
after being decrypted with the cell group key and delivered to other group controllers. 
According to the two-layered network model, we propose a hybrid key establishment scheme adopts 
the Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) protocol [5] and Tree-based Group Diffie-Hellman (TGDH) protocol in 
cell groups and control group, respectively. Since LKH and TGDH are well-known key establishment 
schemes, we will not describe them here in detail. However, we do not restrict key establishment protocol 
in each group to only LKH or TGDH. The group controller can choose an appropriate group key 
establishment protocol that he wants for his group according to his communication and computation 
environment without regard to what group key establishment schemes are being used in other groups. The 
main reason for choosing centralized key establishment in cell groups is limited communication and 
computation ability of the group members. In contrast, the control group uses contributory key agreement 
since group controllers are equipped with much more powerful computation and communication abilities. 
Also, contributory key agreement is better suited to coping with the single-point-of-failure problem. In our 
scheme, each cell group is managed by its cell group controller independently of the other cell groups. 
That is, the dynamics of one cell group do not affect the other cell groups.  
Most group key establishment schemes, such as LKH and TGDH, authenticate identities and build a 
secure channel between a member and a group manager by exchanging long-term public key certificates, 
when a member joins a group. Usually, this requires a public key infrastructure (PKI) for checking the 
validity of the public key certificates. However, since group members in cell groups are resource-
constrained, the exchange and verification of public key certificates is a heavy burden. Therefore, in order 
to reduce the extra burden of modes, we use the Implicitly Certified Public Keys method by [12], for the 
purpose of authenticating key agreement between group member and group controller. Implicitly certified 
public keys system have the following advantages: (1) the space storage can be reduced, since extra 
certificates is not need; (2) the computational efforts can be reduced for some cryptographic applications, 
since the explicit public key verification is not required; (3) the communication costs can be saved, since 
it is unnecessary to transmit public key certifications. From above discussions, it can be seen that 
implicitly certified public keys method is suitable for MANETs. 
3.2. System Setup 
Before constituting the wireless mobile self-organize network, each mobile node including group 
controllers and group members obtains its implicitly certified public key from a trusted group authority 
(GA) who is the top level group manager through off-line. GA computes public keys and private keys for 
all mobile nodes who take part in the mobile wireless network prospectively. It is only involved in 
implicitly certified public key generation and distribution phase. The procedure of system setup is 
described in detail as follows. 
Step 1. GA chooses a large prime p and q such that q| p-1, a generator g with order q in pZ .
Step 2. GA chooses a random qx Z∈ , compute .mod
xy g p=
Step 3. Publishes p, q, g and y.
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Step 4. GA computes (pi, si) for each node including group controller and group member by the 
following steps: 











(4_3). Computes || ) ) modi i i is k H ID
−
= p x q+ , where H is a secure hash function and IDi is the 
identity of the node. 
Simultaneously, nodes in control group generate their shared control group key by TGDH scheme. 
Each group controller chooses its local cell group key for secure group communications and distributes 
this common group key to all cell group members to be located in its cell group. All local common group 
keys are distributed through secure channels. 
3.3. Group Member Join and Leave 
In order to join the mobile network, a mobile group member A  possessing a implicitly certified public 
key takes part in a key agreement with the group controller iC  who is the manager of the cell group which 
A joins. For authenticating message and building a secure channel for session, A and i generate a 
symmetric key by the following modified Gunther’s key exchange scheme. The procedure of key 
agreement for building a secure channel between 
C
A and C is described as follows. i
Step 1. A and choose random and , respectively. i iC p
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Step 5. A computes symmetric key , and sends  to C .AC AC ik A C ik ( |D | ID )E I
A and iC exchange their respective public key A and iC , and compute their shared session key ACk






ID  of i were contained in a beacon message which periodically sent by a group controller to notify 
existence of the group controller in a cell group. In step 2, iC adds a description of the valid time duration 
T for going on protocol to the message, and 
C
A also adds the hashed T and ie  to the returned message as 
an acknowledgement so that both parties can check the appropriate date of transfer to the receiver. In 
addition to the date integrity check, when each party computes symmetric key AC ,k A and i exchange a 
key confirmation message by encrypting concatenated identity strings of both parties using the key in 
order to validate the consistency of the established key. The following paragraph will analyze how to 
obtain a shared session key between 
C
A and for building a secure channel. iC
From the A ’s viewpoint, since , and from Step (4_1) at network 








rv p modAkAp g= p
A A Ck s rg p v⋅= = p⋅ ⋅ . The expression 1( ( || ) )mod
i i i iC C C C
s k H ID p x q−= +  in 




s k H ID p= x q+ , then 
( ( || ) ) modC AC i C C Ai i i
k s r H ID p x rg g p
⋅ ⋅ + ⋅
=
        ( || )( )C Ci i AH ID p rx modg g p= ⋅ ( || )( ) mC Ci i AH ID p r od .g y p= ⋅
Then A computes symmetric key  shared by ACk A and asiC
modA A C C Ci i i Ak s r k s rACk g g
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
= ⋅ p ( || )( ( ) )modC Ci iA A
i
H ID ps r
Cv g y p= ⋅ .
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Since A knows { As , ,iCv H , iCID , , , }, thus, iCp y Ar A can compute the value of by above 
expression. 
ACk






A Cv p= p pmod
Cik
Cp g=
modC C A A C Ci i i ik s r r s sC Ag p v
⋅ ⋅ ⋅
= = p . The expression 1 ) moA A ( ( || )A A ds k H ID p=
|| ) ) modA
x−
( ( A
q+  in Step (4_3) at network 
initialization phase can be rewritten as A As k H ID= p x q+ , then 
( ( || ) ) modA C A A CA i ik s r H ID p x rg g p⋅ ⋅ + ⋅= ( || )( ) mCiA A rH ID p od .g y p= ⋅
Then computes symmetric key  as iC ACk
modA A C C Ci i i Ak s r k s rACk g g
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
= ⋅ p ( || )( ( ) ) modC Ci iA As rH ID pAv g y p= ⋅ .
Since C knows {i iCs , v ,A H , AID , , , }, thus, C can compute the value of .A iC i
After key AC  is generated (i.e., the secure channel is built between 
p y r ACk
k A and i .), the cell group 
controller iC renews the common group key, and transports this common group key to 
C
A  by the secure 
channel just building by A and i , then iC distributes the new common group key to other group 
members in is cell group according to well-known LKH protocol. We note that, only ’s cell group key 
is updated, and other cell groups’ keys are not affected.  
C
iC
Fig. 2 illustrates that a nodes M5 joins the cell group which has 4 members and a group controller GC. 
At first, GC and M5 authenticate identities each other and compute their session key  by above 
procedure of key agreement. Then GC generates new cell group key k0, and transports 0ACk  to new 
member M5. In the end, GC distributes k0 to old group member M1, M2, M3 and M4 by LKH scheme. 
ACk
(E )k
Fig. 2. (a) Node M5 joins cell group with one GC and four members and (b) the corresponding LKH tree. The root node of tree 
represents the GC and leaves of tree represent old group members in the cell group. 
When a group member leaves a cell group or a GC removes a compromised group member from its 
cell group, the GC performs group key updating and securely distributes the new group key to the 
remaining group members according to the LKH key establishment scheme. 
4. Analysis of the hybrid key establishment scheme 
In this section, we analyze the features of the proposed hybrid key establishment scheme from four 
aspects as follows. 
• Implicitly public key authentication  
In order to join the ad hoc network, the group member must authenticate identities and build a secure 
channel with group controller each other. Usually, this requires a PKI for checking the validity of the 
certificates, but the exchange and verification of public key certificates is a heavy burden. the proposed 
hybrid key establishment scheme use the implicitly certified public keys method by modified Gunther’s 
key exchange scheme to avoid this heavy burden, for the purpose of authenticating key agreement 
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between group member and group controller. we know that the public key of each node is derived from 
identifier string by group authority and the above key agreement procedure uses ID of the other party to 
compute pairwise key, if the key confirmation message of step 4 and step 5 in Section 3.3 is properly 
decrypted and both parties are convinced that they established a same session key, the public key of the 
other party is certified simultaneously. This implicitly public key authentication can reduce the 
computational cost. 
• Security
The main security requirements of group key establishment are forward security and backward security 
in group communications. In our proposed hybrid key establishment scheme, the security of a group key 
depends on both LKH scheme and TGDH scheme. We should note that their forward security and 
backward security in LKH and TGDH was demonstrated in [5] and [3], respectively. So we can draw a 
conclusion that the proposed scheme possesses forward and backward security.  
In addition, the security of the initial key agreement between group member and group controller using 
implicitly public key authentication is based on SDSS protocol [12], and its security depends on the 
difficulty of solving the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) and the security of the underlying hash 
function. If an adversary wants to obtain an LKH group key, he must first compute AC  shared between a 
group member 
k
A and a group controller In order to obtain this key, the adversary must know one of the 
secret values of the two parties, 
iC
1( ( || ) ) modj j j is k H
− ID p x q= +  and a random value jr of another party. 
However, the secret value js is provided securely by the group controller before joining the ad hoc 
network. Therefore, the adversary is not able to compute js without knowing the group controller’s secret 
value x . Moreover, it is computationally hard to compute Ar  by eavesdropping on exchanged messages, 
which is based on the difficulty of the Diffie-Hellman and the discrete logarithm problems. 
• Scalability
In our hybrid key establishment scheme, cell-level membership changes in one cell group do not affect 
any other cell groups. The “one affects all” type failure never appears. In general, each cell and control 
group is free to choose its own group key establishment method. We propose LKH key establishment 
scheme for cell group and TGDH key agreement method for the control group. Also, through 
decentralization, we avoid the single-point-of-failure problem. Moreover, by dividing the whole group 
into several cell groups, our scheme provides a scalable solution for the MANETs. When a group 
member’s membership changes, namely, a member join or leave the cell group, the cell group key is 
changed by group controller. The new common key is only distributed to remaining members in current 
cell group; other cell groups are not affected.  
• Cost  
The cost of the hybrid key establishment scheme can be evaluated in two aspects - key computational 
cost and key storage cost. We determine both the costs in terms of LKH scheme and TGDH scheme. In a 
cell group, we can use LKH scheme. Although TGDH scheme involves modular exponentiations for key 
computation, but it is a computationally efficient scheme among group key agreement protocols [1]. Let N
and M represent the size of cell group and control group, respectively, |K1| and |K2| represent the length-
key of LKH scheme and TGDH scheme, respectively. The cost that group members store keys 
is 1 , and the cost that group controllers store keys is 1 2 . The 
computational cost that group members update key is
log | |N K⋅ 2log | | log | |N K M K⋅ + ⋅
(log )LKHO N , and the computational cost that group 
controllers update key is (log ) (log )LKH TGDO M+ HO N .
5. Conclusions 
A hybrid group key establishment scheme is proposed for mobile ad hoc network in this paper. In 
proposed scheme, a ad hoc network is divided into a control group and cell groups. The impact of a 
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membership change is contained to a single cell group and does not propagate outside it to other cell 
groups. In order to reduce the computational and communication costs for resource limited group 
members, the centralized LKH group key establishment scheme is used in cell groups, whereas to avoid 
the single-point-of-failure problem, the TGDH group key agreement scheme is adopted in control group. 
In addition, the proposed hybrid key establishment scheme employs the implicitly certified public keys 
method to achieve authenticated key agreement between group member and group controller. This 
method can avoid the need to manage public key certificates.  
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